






UCD CENTRE  FOR  ECONOMIC  RESEARCH 
 





             
 
         Comment on: Electoral Contests, Incumbency 
             Advantages, and Campaign Finance 
 
           Ivan Pastine, University College Dublin and 
              Tuvana Pastine, National University of Ireland Maynooth  
                       










UCD SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN 









 F R O N T M A T T E R
Comment  on:  Electoral Contests, Incumbency









This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a
cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters
have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implica-
tions  are  starkly  different  from  the  previously  analyzed  case  where
voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign
spending.  We  find  that  a  spending  cap  always  favors  the  a  priori
popular candidate. This result holds irrespective of whether it is the
incumbent or the challenger who is able to more effectively generate
and spend contributions.
Keywords: Campaign Finance Reform, Spending Limit, Expenditure
Limit, Incumbency Advantage, Clean ElectionsB O D Y
Meirowitz (2008) studies incumbency advantage in a framework where political candi-
dates compete in campaign spending with and without spending caps. Two measures of
incumbency advantaged are used. In the analysis without spending caps Meirowitz (2008)
studies the influence of fund-raising ability/campaigning effectiveness, and the degree to
which voters have a predisposition toward a candidate in the absence of campaign spend-
ing. However, in the examination of spending caps Meirowitz (2008) focuses on an environ-
ment where voters have no predisposition toward either candidate but simply respond to the
candidate  with  higher  campaign  spending.  For  the  general  case  where  candidates  may
differ in fund-raising ability and voters have an initial predisposition, the only result pre-
sented is for a cap so restrictive that it curtails all competition. No result is presented for a
less restrictive expenditure limit where the cap influences electoral competition, but does
not entirely eliminate it. Here we supply this missing proposition. 
The inclusion of a priori voter preferences makes a stark difference to the implications.
When voters are indifferent between candidates in the absence of campaign spending an
expenditure cap may help or hurt the candidate who is able to more effectively generate
and spend contributions depending on which of the multiple equilibria is selected. We show
that when voters have an initial preference over candidates, however mild the preference
may be, there is only a single equilibrium and the expenditure cap always helps the candi-
date who is favored by the voters prior to campaign spending. This result holds for all
levels of fund-raising ability and irrespective of the identity of the candidate with the fund-
raising/campaign-spending advantage.
The initial preference of voters gives the favored candidate a head-start advantage: He
does not need to spend as much as his rival in order to win. Given that the rival cannot
spend more than the cap, the a priori popular candidate has the option of winning without
having to spend as much as the cap. Hence the cap effectively only restricts his rival. So the
cap favors the incumbent only if he already enjoys the popular position. Otherwise a more
restrictive cap will improve the challenger’s chances of winning as well as his expected
payoff. 
Nassmacher (2006) reports that “[t]raditionally campaign spending in the Anglo-Saxon
orbit is subject to legal constraints.” Walecki (2007) finds that of 60 democracies studied,
25 have spending limits including the U.K., Canada, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Bel-
1gium, New Zealand, and Israel. While in the U.S. mandatory spending limits were struck
down by the Supreme Court, voluntary limits are an increasingly active policy area. Public
financing of political campaigns has taken a new lease of life with the movement loosely
grouped under the banners “Clean Elections” or “Fair Elections.” Candidates who choose
to participate the Clean Elections initiative are subject to spending caps.  Maine was the
first state to pass a Clean Elections Law which went into effect in 2000. In 2008, 85% of
successful candidates had accepted voluntary spending limits. Connecticut is the first state
to enact Clean Elections for all state offices. In the first run in 2008, 80% of the winners
were Clean Elections candidates. Currently seven states have passed Clean Elections laws.
In 2008 voluntary campaign spending limit legislation passed the California legislature and
is awaiting ratification via referendum in 2010. If it passes more than a quarter of the U.S.
population will be living in states with voluntary caps on campaign expenditures. As such it
is worth inquiring what the likely effect of such caps may be.
Next we present the results, and in the final section we use them to offer insights into the
effects  of  campaign  spending  limits  on  the  balance  of  power  between  incumbents  and
challengers both in the European context where the limits are compulsory and in the U.S
context where they are voluntary in states with public funding programs.
Results
We maintain the framework of Meirowitz (2008). Define f  as the candidate that the
majority of voters prefer in the absence of campaign spending. These preferences provide
him with an initial advantage a>0. Let u be his rival candidate. If the initial advantage is
too strong, a¥ 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bu  even if candidate f  engages in no campaign spending it would not be
worthwhile  for  candidate  u  to  compete.  We study  all  nontrivial  cases  where  the  initial
advantage ae0, 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bu . 
In  Proposition  7  Meirowitz  (2008)  establishes  the  equilibrium  when  the  cap  is  very
restrictive. When k §a candidate u is unable to overcome the voters’ initial predisposition
towards f  and so the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies where neither of the candi-
dates engage in campaign spending. Below we characterizes the unique equilibrium with a
binding spending cap which is not too restrictive, k >a. Define a “binding cap” as a cap
which is lower than the maximum of the upper bounds of the no-cap equilibrium spending
supports. The supports of the equilibrium spending levels without a cap are established in
2Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 of Meirowitz (2008).1 A “more restrictive cap” refers to a smaller
k  when the cap is binding. Either candidate may be the better fund-raiser and/or have an
advantage in effective campaign spending, so we put no restrictions on the relative sizes of
bf  and bu. The proposition is valid for any tie-breaking rule the voters use when indiffer-
ent between candidates.
Proposition 8. (1)With a binding spending cap and k >a there is no pure-strategy equilib-
rium  if  aœ0, 1 bu.  The  equilibrium  is  characterized  by  unique  cumulative  density





buaf +a  foraf œ 0, k -a
1 foraf > k -a
Fuau =
    

   
1- bfk -a forau œ 0, a
1-b fk - au forau œ a, k
1 forau > k
(2) Expected spending: Eaf = 2-b uk +a k -a2  and Eau =b fk2 -a 22. 
(3) Candidate  f ’s  expected  utility  is  EUf = 1-b fk -a,  and  candidate  u’s  expected
utility is EUu = 0.
(4) The probability that candidate f  wins is pf = 1-b f b u k2 -a 22.
Proof: In the Appendix.
As long as the cap is not so restrictive that it suppresses all competition, k >a, there is
no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. When voters have initial preferences candidate f has a
headstart advantage. The optimal response of candidate f to a spending level aʹ is either to
spend slightly higher than aʹ-a or to drop out of the contest altogether, so aʹ would not be
optimal for candidate u.2  The unique equilibrium is  in mixed strategies.  In equilibrium
there is a probability that candidate u spends more than candidate f but not by enough to
overcome the voters’ preferences. Hence the model is consistent with the weak empirical
evidence of the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes.
With a more restrictive cap (lower k), candidate f’s probability of winning goes up and
expected total campaign spending goes down. The cap always helps the candidate who is
preferred initially. Candidate u is constrained by the expenditure cap, k. But candidate f is
not effectively constrained since he never needs to spend more than k -a in order to win..
This advantage allows candidate f to capture a strictly positive expected utility from the
3contest  equal  to  1- bfk -a.  Hence  as  the  cap  becomes  more  restrictive  candidate  u
becomes more constrained which is to the advantage of the candidate who is popular a
priori. This decreases the overall aggressiveness of candidate u, which in turn induces less
aggressive spending from candidate f, leading to decreased expected aggregate spending.
The discussion above is valid even when there are cross-cutting asymmetries such that
one candidate has a fund-raising or campaigning advantage b u< b f  and the other has an
advantage due to the predisposition of voters. In this case in the absence of a cap Meirowitz
(2008)  Proposition  4  applies.  If  the  initial  predisposition  of  the  voters  is  not  too
strong, a< 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bu - 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bf ,  then without a cap the strong campaigning ability of the unfavored
candidate  overwhelms the favored candidate’s advantage arising from the voters’  initial
predisposition.  Hence the candidate who is more efficient in campaign effort is able to
capture a positive expected utility from the competition, EU u = 1-b u 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bf +a > 0  while
EU f = 0. However when a binding cap is introduced, even if it is just barely binding, our
Proposition 8 implies that the candidate with more efficient fund raising is no longer able to
take full advantage of his low bu, as he is restricted by the cap. Thus the cap switches the
identity of the dominating candidate from the candidate with efficient campaign manage-
ment  to  the  candidate  with  the  head-start  advantage,  EUf = 1- bfk -a > 0  and
EV u = 0. This applies even if the head-start advantage is very small.
Implications
A spending cap will always favor the candidate with the initial voter preference advan-
tage. Irrespective of the tie-breaking rule and irrespective of cost advantages, the incum-
bent will benefit from the spending cap if and only if the incumbent happens to be the a
priori popular candidate. It is often conjectured that incumbents have advantages both in
fund raising and in voters’ initial perceptions. However, voters’ perceptions do change with
occasional partisan realignments, electoral tides, or personal scandals. These results suggest
that during ordinary times one would expect to see incumbents more secure in jurisdictions
with spending caps as caps allow them to make full use of their advantage due to voters’
predispositions. However, in extraordinary times, such as in the wake of scandals, incum-
bents facing expenditure caps would be exceedingly vulnerable to shifts in voter percep-
tions, as they would not be able to effectively use their superior fund-raising ability to
overcome the difficulty.
4Many democracies have mandatory campaign expenditure limits in place such as the
U.K., Canada, France and Israel. Proponents of expenditure limits often claim that without
such limits larger parties would have an unfair advantage over smaller parties. One interpre-
tation of a  is the initial advantage due to being from a large party with more party-loyal
voters. Proposition 8 implies that a cap on campaign expenditure may in fact benefit the
larger party (the party with the headstart advantage) rather than the smaller party, contrary
to one of its intended consequences. It also means that expenditure caps will tend to solid-
ify the advantage of the party with the larger loyal voter base, making competitive districts
less so and making safe districts even safer. Note that this is true irrespective of which
party has a fund-raising advantage.
In the U.S. while there are caps on political contributions, there are no compulsory limits
on campaign expenditures. Mandatory expenditure limits were struck down by the 1976
Supreme Court ruling on Buckley v. Valeo as unconstitutional limitations on free speech.
However,  the  effect  of  expenditure  limits  is  still  of  interest  in  the  U.S.  context.  For
instance, the “Clean Elections” movement is a voluntary public-funding experiment which
limits  the  campaign  spending  of  participating  candidates.  Clean  Elections  have  been
adopted  by  Arizona,  Connecticut,  Maine,  Massachusetts,  New  Mexico,  Vermont,  North
Carolina, and in the cities of Albuquerque, New Mexico and Portland, Oregon. This is an
active policy area. In 2008 a Clean Elections Bill which includes expenditure limits passed
the California legislature and is awaiting ratification via referendum in 2010. The move-
ment has been gaining momentum in recent years putting serious pressure on candidates. In
legislative elections, the percentage of incumbents who opted for Clean Elections where
available was 51% in 2002, 76% in 2004 and 82% in 2006.3  Proposition 8 suggests that
politicians  who  are  already  popular  would  benefit  from  running  in  a  environment  with
spending limits and thus they would volunteer to join the system and put pressure on their
rivals in the guise of “clean politics.”
B A C K M A T T E R
5Appendix
Let z œ 0, 1 be the probability that candidate f  wins in case of a tie: au = af +a.
Claim 1. Candidate u will not put a probability mass point on any level of spending greater than
zero. Candidate f will not put a probability mass point on any level of spending af œ 0, k -a.
There is no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: Suppose that u’s lowest mass point in 0, k is a'. If z < 1 candidate f  will not put any
probability at or in the open interval below a'-a as a slight increase in spending would result in
a discrete increase in f ’s probability of winning. In this case u could lower his spending slightly
without decreasing his probability of winning. If z = 1 then f  will have no probability in the open
interval just below a' as a slight increase in spending would result in a discrete increase in probabil-
ity. Hence u  would lose nothing by a slight decrease in his spending, and hence cannot have a
mass point at any a' œ 0, k. Since u has no mass point at k  candidate f  can win with certainty
with af = k -a so f  will not exceed that. The symmetric argument as above establishes that f
can  have  no  mass point  on  a' œ 0, k -a .  Since  candidate u  cannot  have  a  mass point  on  a
positive level of spending, in any pure-strategy equilibrium u must be exerting zero spending. If
so, u prefers lower spending than k -a and he cannot have a mass point in 0, k -a  so the only
possibility  for  a  pure-strategy  equilibrium  involves  both  candidates  exerting  zero  spending.
However u would prefer a spending level of just over a which would guarantee victory. á
Claim 2. If  z ∫ 0  candidate  u  will  put  zero  probability  on  au œ 0, a,  if  z=0  u  will  put  zero
probability on au œ 0, a. 
Proof: Candidate u will not choose spending of au œ 0, a as zero spending wins with the same
probability.  If  z ∫ 0  candidate  u  has  a  strictly  positive  probability  of  winning  with  au =a if
af = 0. Either this chance is small enough that his expected value is negative, in which case he
would prefer zero spending, or a slight increase in his spending would result in a discrete increase
in his chance of winning. á
Claim 3. Candidate u has an infimum spending level of zero au
inf = 0 and EVu = 0.
Proof: au
inf < k  as u cannot go above the cap and he cannot have a mass point at k  by Claim 1.
Suppose au
inf œ a, k, then f  would  never choose af œ 0, au
inf -a   as f  would  be putting  in
positive spending and would lose for sure since the probability of u  having spending of au
inf  is
zero by Claim 1. Therefore u could lower his spending without changing his probability of win-
ning. Suppose au
inf =a. By Claim 1 the probability of u  having spending a is zero. Hence if f
chose zero spending f  would lose for sure and get a zero payoff. Since f  can guarantee a positive
payoff with spending of k -a+¶, he will not choose zero spending. Thus candidate u  will not
choose spending of a. The final possibility is that au
inf =a but that u is mixing in the open interval
above a. Since by Claim 1, f  has no mass point on 0, ¶ the probability of winning with spend-
ing of a+¶ is a
a+¶
ffx-a  dx which is approximately zero for small ¶. So with spending a+¶
candidate u is putting in positive spending for a negligible probability of winning, hence au
inf∫a.
au
infœ(0,a) is not possible by Claim 2 so u’s infimum spending must be zero. Since zero is in the
support of his mixed strategy and he loses with certainty with that spending EVu = 0. á
Claim 4. Candidate u  has a supremum spending of k, au
sup = k. Candidate  f  has a supremum
spending of k -a and EVf = 1-b fk -a > 0.
Proof:  au
sup = 0  is  not  possible  by  Claim  1.  If  au
sup œ 0, k  then  f  would  never  set
af > max0, au
sup -a  since f  can win for sure with that spending as the probability of u choos-
6ing au
sup  is zero by Claim 1. Therefore u could win for sure with spending au
sup +¶  yielding a
positive  payoff  for  small  enough  ¶,  a  contradiction  of  Claim  3.  Likewise  af
sup < k -a allows
candidate u an opportunity to guarantee a positive payoff and hence contradicts Claim 3. Candi-
date  f  can  win  for  sure  with  spending  in  the  open  interval  above  k -a so  af
sup = k -a and
EVf = 1-b fk -a  > 0. á
Claim 5. For candidate f  spending levels almost everywhere on af œ 0, k -a  and for candi-
date u spending levels almost everywhere on au œ a,k  must have positive probability.
Proof: Suppose there were an interval t, s in a, k where candidate u had zero probability of
spending. Then f  would have zero probability of spending on t -a , s-a  since f  could lower
his spending to t -a and have the same chance of winning by Claim 1. But in this case u would
never have spending of s+¶ as he could lower his spending to t, saving s+¶-t in spending and
losing only Ffs+¶-a -Ffs-a  in probability of winning. By Claim 1 this loss in probability
is negligible for small ¶. So if there were an interval of zero probability it must go all the way up
to k, which contradicts Claim 4. A symmetric argument rules out ranges of zero probability for
candidate f  on 0, k -a . á
Proof of Proposition 8
Part (1): The above claims demonstrate that in equilibrium u is indifferent among all spending
levels  almost  everywhere  on  0 a, k  and  f  is  indifferent  among  spending  levels  almost
everywhere on 0, k -a . EVu = 0 by Claim 3. On au œ a, k candidate u wins with probability
Ffau -a   as there is zero probability that af = au -a by Claim 1. So indifference of u  in that
range implies Ffau -a -b u au = 0. This yields Ffa = a+a  bu " a œ 0, k -a . Hence f  has
a  probability  mass  of  abu  at  zero  and  a  mass  in  the  open  interval  above  k -a of  1-b u k.
EVf = 1-b fk -a  > 0  by  Claim  4.  On  af œ 0, k -a   candidate  f  wins  with  probability
Fuaf +a   as there is zero probability that au = af +a by Claim 1. So the indifference of f  in
that range implies Fuaf +a -b f af = 1-b fk -a . This Fua = 1-k +a bf  " a œ a, k. u
has a probability mass of 1-kbf  at zero spending. By Claim 2 u puts zero probability on 0, a.
Part (2): On au œ a, k the p.d.f. of u’s spending is fuau =b f . Hence his expected spending is
a
k
fux x dx=b fk2 -a 22. On au œ 0, k -a   the p.d.f. of f ’s spending is ffaf =b u  and f
has  a  probability  mass  in  the  open  interval  above  k -a.  Hence  his  expected  spending  is
0
k-a
ffx x dx+1-Ffk -a  k -a  =2-b uk +a  k -a 2.
Part (3): Given by Claim 3 and Claim 4.
Part (4): In equilibrium there is zero probability of ties where au = af +a by Claim 1 so the
probability that u  wins is given by pu = a
k
Ffx-a  fux dx= a
k
bf bu x dx=b f buk2 -a 22.
p f = 1- p u.á
7Notes
1 In Meirowitz (2008) Lemma 2, f  is candidate 1 and u is candidate 2, and in his
Lemma 3, f is candidate 2 and u is candidate 1. i If candidate f  has the cost
advantage, bf § bu, then a cap k < 1 bu  is binding. (ii) If candidate u has a cost
advantage,    bf > bu,  and  the  voters’  preferences  are  strong,
1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bu - 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bf <a< 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
bu  then a cap k < 1 bu  is binding. iii If candidate u has cost
advantage, bf > bu, and the voters’ preferences are mild 0 <a< 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bu - 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bf  then a
cap k < 1 ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ bf +a is binding. 
2 If voters always choose candidate f  when indifferent, f  would choose exactly
a'-a as he can win with certainty with that spending, however as u would lose
with certainty in that case u would not choose a' in equilibrium.
3 For detailed information see http://www.commoncause.org.
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